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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RAY LINDSAY, Individually, and
RAY LINDSAY, as Administrator
of the Estate of Grace Lindsay,
Deceased,
Pl amtz
. .ffs an d A ppell ants,
vs.

Case No.
12550

GIBBONS AND REED, a Utah
corporation ' Defend ant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
suffered by plaintiff, Ray Lindsay, and for the wrongful death of his wife.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the Court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and
entered judgment in favor of defendant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
directed verdict and judgment entered thereon.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September I I, 1965, at approximately eight
o'clock p.m. on a clear dark night, the plaintiff was
driving in a westerly direction on U.S. Highway 40
west of Salt Lake City near the Tooele County line.
At approximately the same time, a vehicle being driven
by Ester Lewis was proceeding on the same highway
in an easterly direction near the same county line (R.
I32-136, Exhibit 7P). The highway had been under
construction for some time as a freeway was being
installed to replace the old highway. Defendant was the
General Contractor. Both east and west bound lanes
of traffic were being carried on one portion of the
divided highway that was under construction. All of
the paving on the highway had been completed by the
defendant and the highway was in the process of being
striped by employees of the State Road Commission
(R.221-223). Part of the center line striping had
actually been installed and the remainder of the newly
constructed road had 4-inch wide by I2-inch long paint
daubs on the center of the highway (R.216). The State
Highway painting crew was making its stripe on the
center of the highway by following from one daub to
another (R.224).
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Plaintiff testified that he could clearly see the road
ahead with the headlights on low beam. He also could
see the right edge of the highway as he drove in a
westerly direction toward where the accident occurred.
He had no trouble staying on the right side of this
50-foot wide roadway and could clearly see ahead
(lt.203-204).
As the plaintiff approached within approximately
1,000 feet of the scene of the accident, he testified that
he was able to see the automobile of Ester Lewis
approaching him from the west. The headlights of Mr.
Lewis's automobile did not interfere with his vision or
driving ( R. 204) . When the plaintiff neared the point
of impact, he noticed that Mr. Lewis's automobile was
on the wrong side of the road and in an effort to avoid
a collision, the plaintiff turned to the right edge of the
roadway just moments before the impact occurred
(R.206).
At the point of impact, the pavement was approximately 50 feet in width (R.147}. The point of impact
determined by the investigating officers was 11 feet 8
inches south of the north edge of the pavement in the
west-bound lane of traffic (R.149}.
Upon arriving at the scene, one of the investigating
officers checked and determined that plaintiff's wife
had been killed outright in the accident and that her
husband, Ray Lindsay, although conscious, had received facial injuries and other injuries. The officer
then proceeded to the other automobile being driven
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by Mr. Lewis and found Mr. Lewis sitting in the automobile. Lewis was conscious. The officer questioned
Mr. Lewis as to the cause of the accident. Mr. Lewis
told the investigating officer that he was proceeding
toward Salt Lake City at a speed of about 60 miles per
hour when he approached the area where the impact
occurred. He admitted without explanation to being
on the wrong side of the road. He said he first noticed
plaintiff's automobile when it was 50 feet away, at
wWch time he attempted to turn sharply to the left into
what appeared to be an open field to avoid impact, but
was unable to do so (R.143, 153-154).
Plaintiff's witnesses testified on cross-examination
that the area of construction for east-bound traffic had
a sign posting the speed at 25 miles per hour (R.156).
There were various other cautionary signs indicating
the construction area ( R.173) . The paintiff testified
that he was well aware of the fact that he was driving
in a construction zone (R.182, 203-204).
There was no evidence as to the cause of the accident other than the fact that Mr. Lewis told the officers
that he was driving on the wrong side of the road at
the time the accident occurred. The plaintiffs sued the
defendant, Gibbons and Reed, as well as Mr. Lewis
and accepted a settlement from Mr. Lewis in the sum
of $23,500.00 prior to trial (R.207-208).
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POINT URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONFAILED TO
CLUDED THAT
PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT
PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES, AND THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT
PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S
INJURIES, AND THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE.
Plaintiff produced evidence that the accident occurred, that the plaintiff was injured, and his wife was
killed. He also produced evidence that the driver of the
vehicle colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle admitted to
the police officers at the scene of the accident that he
was driving on the wrong side of the road and driving
at a speed considerably in excess of the posted speed
limit for the construction zone. There was no evidence
as to why the east-bound vehicle was on the wrong
side of the road. Plaintiff asked the court to speculate
that the east-bound driver, Mr. Lewis, was confused
for some reason and that his confusion was caused by
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the defendant. Plaintiff asked that the jury be allowed
to infer that Mr. Lewis was confused and that his confusion came about as a result of some condition of the
highway attributable to the defendant. There was no
evidence as to any confusion on the part of Mr. Lewis
nor was there any evidence to show the actual cause of
Mr. Lewis being on the wrong side of the road.
The Court has said on several occasions that the
strongest kind of presumption exists pointing to negligence of a person driving on the wrong side of the
road. (Station vs. Western Macaroni Company, 52
Utah 426, 174 P.821). The plaintiff failed to prove
why the Lewis vehicle was on the wrong side of the
road at the time of impact. He, in substance, asked the
court to permit the jury to speculate as to the possibility or probability that Mr. Lewis was confused, and
if so, that his confusion was caused by some condition
created by the defendant rather than from some other
cause. The probabilities of Mr. Lewis getting on to the
wrong side of the highway and failing to observe the
headlights on the plaintiff's oncoming automobile until
fifty feet away, could come about as a result of various
probabilities. Was he tuning the car radio and not
paying attention to his driving at the time? Was he
attempting to light a cigarette? Or, did he have his
head turned talking to his wife at the time he got over
to the wrong side of the road? Was he tired from his
long trip from California causing him to doze for a
few minutes, drifting to the wrong side of the highway
before noticing the oncoming vehicle of the plaintiff?
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All of these possibilities as to his reason for being on
the wrong side of the road exist. Plaintiff was without
any proof whatsoever as to the reason for the Lewis
vehicle being on the wrong side of the road.
The trial court concluded from plaintiff's evidence
that any jury findings would be based on sheer speculation. The Lewis vehicle was on the wrong side of the
road. The reason for it being there was unexplained.
The trial court correctly concluded that the presumption of negligence of the driver of the Lewis
vehicle prevailed against the speculative evidence produced by the plaintiff. This Court stated in the case of
DeMille vs. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159,
as follows:
"A choice of probabilities creates only a basis
for conjecture on which a verdict of the jury
cannot stand."
See also Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d
986.

In the DeMille case, supra, the Court was faced
with a head-on collision in which all of the parties were
killed. The evidence indicated that one driver was on
the wrong side of the road. The trial court permitted
the issues of negligence to go to a jury. On appeal, this
Court stated:

"If the court concludes that the opposing party

has failed to produce sufficient evidence to over-
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come the presumed facts and such facts are dispositive of the case, the court should direct a
verdict in accordance therewith."
The plaintiff, in his brief, relies most heavily on the
case of Edmunds vs. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215, 364
P.2d 1015. In the Edmunds case, the facts were substantially different from the instant case. Edmunds
stated that he saw the cut in the highway but it had
the appearance of being an asphalt access road crossing
the old highway and upon realizing his mistake, it
was too late to stop. Thus, Edmunds fully explained
why he drove into the area of danger and did not leave
his reasons to the speculation or conjecture of a jury.
In the instant case, the only evidence produced by the
plaintiff as an explanation for the Lewis vehicle being
on the wrong side of the roadway was founded on speculation. The driver of the Lewis vehicle was chargeable
with a strong presumption of negligence in being on
the wrong side of the road at the time he collided with
the plaintiff. Lewis's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the accident.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly analyzed the facts and
lack of evidence presented by the plaintiff, and directed
a verdict against him. It would have been most improper
for the trial court to have allowed a jury to speculate
on all of the possible reasons for the Lewis vehicle
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being on the wrong side of the roadway. Any verdict
for the plaintiff would have been based solely on conjecture. The trial judge so ruled and his ruling should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
F. Robert Bayle of
Bayle and Lauchnor
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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